Abstract. This paper focuses on determining ordering and pricing policies in a singleperiod closed-loop supply chain. The assumed supply chain includes a number of manufacturers who provide their di erent, yet substitutable, products for their customers via a common retailer; however, manufacturers can have their own internet-based sales channels in order to provide products for the customers. The customers can return products if they are not satis ed with them. The returned products are collected in a repair center, repaired, and sold as second-hand products through the retailer's channel or through an internet-based sale channel. The customer demand is assumed to be stochastic. This study aims to determine the optimum prices for the internet-based and retailer's sales channels for the initial and second-hand products. It also tries to determine the optimal values of retailer order and production rates of manufacturers and repair centers. Three types of game strategies for the supply chain, including Nash, Stackelberg game with a retailer as the leader, and Stackelberg game with manufacturers and repair center as the leaders, are studied in a decentralized condition. The analytical equilibrium solutions, equations, and constraints are extracted for these strategies. Finally, the e ect of variations in key parameter is investigated.
Introduction
The widespread use of internet has convinced many manufacturers, such as Panasonic, Kodak, and Apple, to exploit internet-based sales channels. Today, supply chains face competition among sales channels as well as competition among brands. Gan et al. (2017) [1] showed that implementing a separate channel, such as the internet channel, could improve the total supply chain's pro t, as compared to the singlechannel approach. Recently, considerable researches have been conducted on the impact of internet-based sales channels and their pricing strategies. Chiang et al. (2003) [2] pointed out that generating internetbased sales channels was valuable for manufacturers and retailers leading to increased pro tability. Since price is a prominent factor a ecting product demand, its optimization signi cantly a ects acquiring a desirable market share. Kumar and Ruan (2006) [3] demonstrated that manufacturers and retailers' decisions on pricing were in uenced by customers' loyalty to brand and sales channels. Dai et al. (2005) [4] investigated optimum pricing strategies while retailers were competing for attracting more customers. Kurata et al. (2007) [5] obtained the optimal pricing policy in the presence of competition between brands and sales channels.
The optimal ordering policy is another crucial factor that a ects the pro t and cost of a supply chain as well as the pricing strategy. This factor is the optimal value of order. Chung et al. (2014) [6] examined pricing and inventory policies in a supply chain with multiple suppliers using four strategies and game theory.
The importance of the environment protection has necessitated the decrease of exploited raw materials as well as increasing product recycling. Therefore, a Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) has attracted great attention in recent years. In Europe, around 5.5 to 6.5 Million tons of electrical materials waste are produced annually and are anticipated to increase 16-28% annually [7] . Remanufacturing is a recovery process that transforms a used product (second-hand product) into a \like-new" product [1] . Gan et al. (2017) [1] developed a pricing decision model for short life-cycle products in a closed-loop supply chain that consists of the manufacturer, retailer, and collector. In this study, the new product is sold via traditional retail stores, and the remanufactured product is sold via the manufacturer's direct channel. Huang et al. (2013) [8] determined the optimal pricing and recycling strategies in a CLSC with two recycling centers using game theory. Maiti and Giri (2015) [9] employed game theory to determine an optimal pricing strategy in a CLSC. Ramezani et al. (2014) [10] investigated the nancial perspective in a given closed-loop nancial chain. Kaya and Urek (2016) [11] analyzed a network design problem for a closed-loop supply chain and presented a mixed integer nonlinear facility locationinventory-pricing model to decide on the optimal locations of the facilities, inventory amounts, prices for new products, and incentive values for the collection of right amount of used products in order to maximize the total supply chain pro t.
Game theory is a popular technique for competitive problems due to its simplicity and logical procedure. Numerous studies have been carried out in recent years on determining competitive parameters including price, service level, and the order size using game theory. Dan et al. (2012) [12] utilized game theory to determine optimal pricing policies and an optimal service level in a supply chain consisting of a traditional retailer and two manufacturers who use internet for selling their products. Chen et al. (2013) [13] determined a pricing policy for a supply chain, including a retailer and two manufacturers, in a decentralized condition using game theory. In this research, it was assumed that one of these manufacturers had its own internetbased distribution channel. Zhao et al. (2013) [14] proposed a method based on game theory through which optimal pricing and distribution policies were determined in a supply chain including two suppliers and a common retailer. Furthermore, the parameters are assumed to be vague. In Tiaojun and Tiantian study (2013), [15] optimal decisions associated with price and service levels were made using game theory in a supply chain which employed a Vendor Management Inventory (VMI) policy. In another study, Chung et al.
(2014) [6] utilized game theory in order to determine the optimal pricing and coordination policies in a supply chain. The investigated supply chain included a traditional retailer and a number of manufacturers who utilized internet sales channels. Optimal pricing policies were obtained for a supply chain with two manufacturers who gave two substitutable products and a common retailer using game theory by Zhao et al. (2014) [16] . In this research, di erent competitive policies together with di erent power structures were considered for each member of the chain. The game theory was also used by Zhao and Wang (2015) [17] in a fuzzy environment in order to determine pricing and service levels in a supply chain with one supplier and two retailers. Maiti and Giri (2017) [18] studied a two-period supply chain model which is comprised of one manufacturer and one retailer involved in trading a single product. They assumed that the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader and declares wholesale price(s) to the retailer who follows the manufacturer's decision and sets his selling prices for two consecutive periods. Zhou et al. (2017) [19] investigated a threeechelon manufacturing and remanufacturing ClosedLoop Supply Chain (CLSC) constituting a retailer, a manufacturer, and a supplier to maintain inventory service levels.
Seung and Byung (2016) [20] determined the sales prices of new and refurbished items in a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a seller, and a refurbisher based on a comprehensive model.
In this paper, a CLSC including a number of manufacturers with their own internet-based sales channels and a traditional retailer who competes with the internet-based sales channels can be considered in the forward supply chain. In the backward chain, a repair center with its internet channel is considered. Due to the competitive structure of the problem, game theory is used for the decentralized condition of the supply chain. Nash and Stackelberg games are used for determining optimal pricing and ordering policies.
Two conditions are considered when using Stackelberg games: retailer leadership and manufacturer and repair center leadership.
The problem is to nd the optimal pricing policy and determine optimal order sizes in single-period as manufacturers produce di erent substitutable products. A manufacturer sells its products to a retailer at a wholesale price, and the retailer provides the product for the customer as shown in Figure 1 . Simultaneously, the manufacturer may give his products via its internetbased sale channel (if there is any). In the given supply chain, the competition is between brands and distribution channels. Customers cannot touch or feel a product before they purchase online. This leads to much higher rates of customer returns in the online channel, which in turn leads to signi cant costs for retailer or manufacturer [21] ; then, it is supposed herein that customers can return purchased products before use (for an internet-based sales channel). It is also supposed that customers may return products after use (for both channels). Products which are not given at delivery time are returned to the corresponding manufacturer through the same service by which it was sent (such as post) without any charge for customers. The return expenses are paid by the manufacturer. It is assumed that a portion of purchased products is returned, repaired, and resold as second-hand products. These returned products are purchased from customers at the price which is the average of initial products price and are sent to a repair center. Afterwards, purchased products are separated and repaired so that they can be sold as second-hand products. An internet-based sale channel (if there is any) and the retailer are responsible for selling the second-hand products. Demand is assumed to be stochastic for all products depending on price, a retailer's channel service level, the competitor's price, and customers' loyalty to the product or sales channel. Order size is assumed stochastic depending on demand and risk factor of customers. The generic structure of the CLSC is depicted in Figure 1 . The given structure, composed of the manufacturers with their own internet-based sales channel, retailers, and repair centers, is more realistic and applicable to the real-world conditions. Therefore, the contribution of this research is solving the investigated problem of inventory and pricing for the given CLSC.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, notations are given. Section 3 presents problem formulation. Section 4 examines the model in a decentralized condition based on Nash game and Stackelberg game policies when either a retailer is the leader or manufacturers with repair center are the leaders. Section 5 gives a numerical example to analyze the problem. The e ects of parameters on pro t and order size are examined in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 gives conclusions and future research ideas.
Notation
Subscripts r and d respectively represent a retailer's and internet-based sales channels; rp represents repaired products (second-hand products), while rc refers to used products which are returned to repair centers by the customer. P ij The price of product i which is sold in channel j (j = r; d; i = 1; Inter-brand-inter-channel sensitivity (inter-channel price sensitivity if i = j) which demonstrates sensitivity of the ith product demand in the retailer's channels to price of the jth product in an internet-based sales channel. It means that if the price of the jth product in the internet-based sales channel increases (decreases) one unit, the demand of the ith product in a retailer's channel increases (decreases)
ijd units (i 6 = j), (i; j = 1; 2; :::; m; rp); ijr Inter-brand-inter-channel sensitivity (inter-channel price sensitivity if i = j) which demonstrates sensitivity of the ith product demand in an internet-based channel to price of the jth product in a retailer's channel. It means that if the price of the jth product in a retailer's channel increases (decreases) one unit, the demand of the ith product in an internet-based channel increases (decreases) ijr units (i 6 = j), (i; j = 1; 2; :::; m; rp); ijd Inter-brand price sensitivity which demonstrates sensitivity of the ith product demand in an internet-based sales channel to the price of the jth product in an internet-based sales channel. It means that if the price of the jth product in an internet-based channel increases (decreases) by one unit, the demand of the ith product in an internet-based channel increases The probability of returning the product before customer use when it is sold in an internet-based sales channel (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp); rrc The probability of returning the product after customer use; rrp
The rate of converting returned products to repaired ones; R Retailer's pro t function; R (i)
Retailer's pro t gained from product i; i Pro t of manufacturer i function (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp); (i(I)) Pro t of manufacturer resulting from internet-based purchase;
Pro t of manufacturer i resulting from retailers' channel; X i A binary variable (if manufacturer i has an internet-based sales channel, it is 1 and is 0 otherwise) (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp).
Problem formulation
The The problem model is a multi-objective maximization problem aimed at optimizing the pro t gained by retailers, manufacturers, and repair centers considering three strategies:
1. Decentralized supply chain considering Nash game structure; 2. Decentralized supply chain considering Stackelberg structure in which manufacturers and repair centers are leaders; 3. Decentralized supply chain considering Stackelberg structure in which a retailer is leader.
In the proposed model, the demand is de ned as a function of price and service level of products in a retailer's channel. Demand of product i in an internetbased channel is de ned as in Eq. (1) where the rst term denotes potential demand of product i in an internet-based channel. The second term represents how product price a ects its demand in an internet-based channel. The third term shows the e ect of price and service level of products o ered in a retailer channel. Finally, the fourth term demonstrates how price of other products in an internet-based channel impacts the demand of product i in this channel. Similarly, demand for the ith product in a retailer's channel is de ned according to Eq. (2). 
The terms utilized in Eq. (2) are the same as those in Eq.
(1). A number of sold products are returned to repair centers after being used by customers. The demand for return (drc) is de ned as a percentage of total sold products (rcc) according to Eq. (3):
where the terms in parentheses show the total sold products in an internet-based channel (the rst term) and a retailer's channel (the second term). It must be noted that the amount of sold products in a channel equals the minimum level demand and its corresponding amount of delivered product in the channel. The percentage of sold products returned after use is represented by rrc. To make the demand for a stochastic value, "rc, a continuous random variable is used as shown in Eq. (4) [11] .
Second-hand products are purchased from customers at P rc. In our model, P rc is de ned as a percentage (rprc%) of average sold products according to Eq. (5):
Demand for second-hand repaired products is linearly proportional to price and service levels of products. Eqs. (6) and (7) 
Details of Eqs. (6) and (7) are the same as those of Eq. (1).
The total sold second-hand products should be less than the number of returned products according to Eq. (8):
Obviously, the price of second-hand products must be less than that of the initial products; thus, the following constraint (Eq. (9)) must be satis ed: P rpr ; P rpd P ir ; P id (i = 1; 2; :::; m):
As seen in equations describing demand (Eqs. (1), (2), (3), (6), (7)), the demand of product i in channel j (d ij ) is a function of undergoing items:
1. Market potential for product i in the corresponding channel j (a ij ) (which is a portion of total market potential (a) according to Eq. (10)):
Eq. (9) is valid as far as Eq. (11) is met:
2. The price of product which is considered with an impact factor equal to self-sensitivity parameter of product i in channel j (b ij ). 3. The price of rival products as well as that of the same product in rival channels. It is included via impact factors modelled by inter-brand and interbrand-inter-channel sensitivities ( ; ). 4. The service level o ered for product i. Its in uence is determined by sensitivity to the service level o ered for product i in a retailer's channel ( ii ; i ). 5. The service level o ered for rival products in a retailer's channel (v j ). It a ects the price through de ned sensitivity parameter between a retailer's service level for product j and demand for product i in a retailer's and internet-based channels ( ij ).
The demand derived for product i in channel j (d ij ) is de nite; however, in real world, there is nothing de nite. As a result, demand is transformed to a stochastic value using " ij random variable. The probabilistic demand is obtained from Eq. (12) [11] . D ij = d ij " ij (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp; j = r; d); (12) where m denotes the number of substitutable products, and rp represents repaired (second-hand) products.
The amount of orders for d ij , i.e., q ij , is determined using Eq. (13) The proposed model is able to generate optimal order values for known values of risk factor.
It is clear that a manufacturer's production may not completely match order as demand is a stochastic variable. Hence, the deliverable amount of q ij is converted into a stochastic variable using y ij continuous random variable, which is denoted by Y ij and is de ned according to Eq. (14) .
Y ij = q ij y ij (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp; j = r; d): (14) Furthermore, it is assumed that a portion of products (R i ) sold in the internet-based sales channel is returned by the customer before use. It is transformed to a stochastic value (r i ) using " i as shown by Eq. (15) 
A customer does not pay while a manufacturer bears the cost of the return of these products (cr i ). Therefore, considering returned products, a manufacturer gains pro t through selling 1 r i percent of sold products. A manufacturer should cover three types of expenses associated with each product i: the cost of production of each unit (cp i ), the cost of distribution across an internet-based channel (cdd i ), and cost of distribution over retailers' channel (cdr i ). As the model is a single-period one, at the end of period, unsold products in the internet-based channel will be considered as surplus. The manufacturer has to sell the surplus at a lower price (s ij ) during period price (P ij ). On the other hand, the number of products provided by the manufacturer might be more than that of ordered products as a consequence of its stochastic nature. In such a circumstance, surplus of product i in channel j would be o ered at a lower price (m ij ) during period price (P ij ). In contrast, since demand, order and deliverable rates are stochastic, the demand for product i in channel j might be more than the number of products. In such a condition, t ij must be paid for each unit of shortage in the products. Manufacturer i o ers retailers his products at a wholesale price (W i ).
In this study, it is assumed that W i value is determined based on long-term contracts made between a retailer and a manufacturer; thus, it is assumed to be constant, as Kurata et al. (2007) [5] made the same assumption. Based on the aforementioned information, the total pro t function of a manufacturer could be shown in the form of Eq. (16) 
where rp(W ) is the pro t of selling second-hand products to a retailer's channel, and rp(I) denotes the pro t gained through selling second-hand products in an internet-based sales channel (if there is an internetbased sales channel, i.e., X rp = 1). Besides, cc Drc is the cost imposed by the classi cation of second-hand products, while (P rc+crrc)Drc is the cost of returning and purchasing second-hand products. rp(W ) and rp(I) are de ned as in Eqs. (21) and (22) (21) and (22), de nitions of the terms are the same as those in Eqs. (19) and (17) .
Prior to solving the model based on various strategies, some assumptions must be mentioned. To solve the problem, three di erent strategies are considered, all of which are based on the decentralized supply chain. 4 . Decentralized supply chain 4.1. Nash game structure
In Nash game, all players have the same power. Their decisions are made such that their pro t is maximized simultaneously. Therefore, the goal is to maximize objective functions (Eq. (26) 
The outcome of the game is not clear when an equilibrium solution does not exist, whereas if there is an equilibrium solution, a decision-maker is able to nd the optimal solution. Cachon and Netessine (2004) [29] proposed a useful method for investigating the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium solution. Topkis (1979 and 1998) [22, 23] and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) [24] utilized the following constraints to examine the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium solution. In the following, the constraints associated with the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium solution are presented; subsequently, the problem is solved in the Nash structure. 
A variety of methods has been proposed to solve such problems, including metaheuristic methods. However, considering Theorem 2 as a default fact, the best and simplest method for deriving de nite optimal values for decision variables is using Kuhn-Tucker method [25] . Additionally, a Kuhn-Tucker method avoids the local optimum that might be provided by metaheuristic methods.
Stackelberg game
Contrary to Nash game, in Stackelberg game, players have di erent powers. In this paper, rst o , a scenario is considered in which manufacturers and repair centers are leaders, while retailers are followers. Afterwards, the second scenario is investigated in which a retailer is the leader and two other players are followers. In the following, the constraints associated with the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg game solutions are presented. 50) 4.2.1. Stackelberg game with manufacturers and repair center as leaders ( rst scenario): In the rst scenario, manufacturers and repair centers are more powerful in the market. That is to say, they decide on price; then, a retailer makes a decision according to the leaders' preferences. Therefore, in the rst step, a problem with objectives shown in Eq. (51) and considering constraints represented by Eqs. (27)- (43) is solved. For this purpose, Kuhn-Tucker conditions are utilized to obtain the optimal values for decision variations P id , q id (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp) in terms of P ir , q ir (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp) [25] . max i (i = 1; 2; :::; m)
By substituting P id , q id (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp) derived from solving Eq. (51) in Eq. (19) and solving a problem whose objective function is Eq. (52) using the KuhnTucker method, the optimal decision values P ir , q ir (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp) are obtained. Constraint equations (Eqs. (27)- (43)) must be noticed.
The optimal values calculated through solving problem equation (Eq. (52)), (P ir , q ir (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp), are substituted into equations regarding P id , q id (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp) which are obtained from Eq. (51). As a result, optimal values of P id , q id (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp) are calculated [26, 27] . A closed-form expression for the optimal retail prices is not reported here because of its complexity.
4.2.2.
Stackelberg game with a retailer as a leader (second scenario) In the second scenario, retailers are dominant in the market. Pricing decisions are made by retailers prior to other players. Following a retailer's decision, manufacturers and repair centers may decide on price. Therefore, a problem with objectives shown in Eq. (53) and considering constraints represented by Eqs. (27) - (43) is solved. For this purpose, Kuhn-Tucker conditions are utilized to obtain the optimal values for variations in P ir , q ir (i = 1; 2; ::::; m; rp) decisions in terms of P id , q id (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp):
By substituting P ir , q ir (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp) derived from solving Eq. (53) into equations related to i (Eqs. (16) and (20)) and solving a problem whose objective function is Eq. (54) using Kuhn-Tucker method, the optimal decision values are obtained. It must be noted that the constraints represented by Eqs. (27)-(43) must be noticed.
max i (i = 1; 2; :::; m)
The optimal values of P id , q id (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp) calculated via solving problem equation (Eq. (54)) are substituted into equations regarding P ir , q ir (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp). As a result, the optimal values of P ir , q ir (i = 1; 2; :::; m; rp) are calculated [26, 27] . For the sake of simplicity, the detailed equations are avoided here.
Numerical example
In this section, a numerical example is developed to demonstrate a managerial perspective which results from the proposed model. To avoid unfavorable complexity and facilitate required comparisons, the numerical example is considered for a case in which there are identical substitutable products from two manufacturers. It is also assumed that two manufacturers have internet-based and retailer's sales channels. The base information is adopted from [28, 5] . 
The pro t of a repair center obtained from the internetbased sales of second-hand products might be calculated using Eq. First of all, the existence and uniqueness of solution were examined for the numerical example. Then, models were solved through the three mentioned scenarios. The results of calculations are summarized in Table 1 (to solve the problem, MATLAB coding is exploited to overcome complexity and heavy computational load).
Analyzing the impact of parameters on pro t and order
To facilitate the analysis of the proposed model, some diagrams are provided in this section. These illustrate how variations in some parameters a ect di erent pro t functions. Figure 2 depicts the e ect of variations in several parameters such as b 1r and b 1d (product price selfsensitivity parameter in retailer's and internet-based Figure 2 . Investigating how self-sensitivity and inter channel sensitivity of product 1 a ect the pro t of manufacturer 1 in Nash game. channels, respectively) and sensitivity to price of product 1 sold in di erent channels ( 11d : inter-channel sensitivity of product 1 demand in a retailer's channel to the price of product 1 in an internet-based channel; 11r : inter-channel sensitivity of product 1 demand in an internet-based channel to the price of product 1 in a retailer's channel). The investigated structure in this gure is Nash game. As is obvious from Figure 2 , self-sensitivity parameters adversely a ect pro tability. They may even lead to negative pro tability in case of an excessive increase. Therefore, sensitivity of customer to price must be reduced. This goal can be achieved by increasing customers' loyalty. Better services, improved accessibility, simple purchasing methods, and modi ed advertisement might be leveraged to increase customers' loyalty. Moreover, sensitivity of product 1 price in a retailer's channel to its demand in an internet-based channel positively a ects pro t. It means that pro t can be increased via boosting customers' loyalty to a speci c channel. In contrast, Figure 3 . The e ect of changes in some parameters on a repair center's pro t.
sensitivity of pro t function to 11d and 11r is much less than its sensitivity to b 1r and b 1d parameters. Therefore, it is concluded that increasing customer's loyalty to the product is more bene cial than increasing customer's loyalty to the sales channel. Figure 3 illustrates how variations in rprpr (the sensitivity of second-hand product demand in an internet-based channel to its price in retailer channel) and b rpd (the self-sensitivity of second-hand product price in an internet-based channel) a ect the pro t of a repair center in Nash game.
Similar to Figure 2 , Figure 3 reveals that selfsensitivity of the second-hand product negatively affects the pro t while its inter-channel sensitivity positively impacts the repair center pro t. Figure 4 shows the e ect of price sensitivity parameters in a Stackelberg structure.
The same conclusions might be derived when parameters are analyzed in Stackelberg game conditions. Figure 4 shows that an increase in self-sensitivity parameters even may lead to negative pro tability. Figure 5 demonstrates how the service level of product 2 a ects the second manufacturer's pro t.
As can be seen in Figure 5 , increasing the service level rstly increases pro tability; however, if it exceeds a speci c bound, it decreases pro t as it raises cost price of the product which, in turn, reduces product desirability for customers. On the other hand, decreasing the service level reduces cost price considerably. Thus, it increases product desirability for customers. Optimal values for service level are derived via solving pro t equations in terms of the optimal service level.
Conclusion
This paper investigated the inventory and pricing problem in a closed-loop supply chain with a few manufacturers and a repair center. Manufacturers generate substitutable products. The repair center collects the products used by customers, repairs them, and sells them as second-hand products at a lower price. Furthermore, customers may return products before use. The returned products are sold again. In the assumed supply chain, manufacturers and repair centers sell their products using a common retailer channel. Besides, they have their own internet-based sales channel. This supply chain model was solved using three di erent strategies in a decentralized manner. The exploited strategies include Nash game, Stackelnberg structure with a manufacturer, a repair center as leaders, and Stackelberg structure with a retailer as the leader. The constraints regarding the existence and uniqueness of solution were also examined. To achieve a better insight, a numerical example was provided which considered identical products. The results demonstrated the importance of competition between sales channels and products. Nevertheless, results revealed that the e ect of inter-brand competition is more crucial than that of inter-channel competitions are. Therefore, players should increase customers' loyalty (and in turn their pro tability) using di erent policies such as increasing service level, better advertisement, and obtaining competitive superiorities.
According to our study, the following topics sound interesting for further research:
Considering internet-based sales channel for a common retailer;
Considering several retailers for a supply chain;
Determining an optimal location of a repair center through solving the location problem. 
